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Abstract 
Corporate governance has drawn world as well as public attention and become an important issue after East Asia 
financial crisis in the year 1997-1998 that hit several countries in Southeast Asia. There are serious weaknesses in 
corporate governance practices like weak financial structure, lack of transparency and accountability and over 
leverage of the companies. Weak governance structure can implicates as one of the reason for excessive rewards to 
CEOs in spite of poor performance. The current research was conducted in order to examine CEO duality and 
compensation in the market for corporate control. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine whether one of 
the proxy corporate governance structure which is CEO duality is further exacerbates CEO’s motivation of self-
interest to engage in mergers and acquisition in order to increase their compensation. This study used various sub-
samples of the firm, which are those that merge and those that have CEO duality in the regression test. The findings 
indicated the companies that having CEO duality (independent variable) has positive relationship with compensation 
scheme (dependent variable). Besides, engagement in merger and acquisition (independent variable) also has 
positive relationship with compensation scheme. Therefore, further regression test are conducted to examine 
whether the companies that engage in merger and acquisition and at the same time having CEO duality position are 
positively related with compensation scheme. The findings showed that there is a positive relationship between 
engagement in merger/acquisition and CEO duality with compensation scheme.  
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1. Introduction  
The corporate sector in Malaysia already has a sound and strong corporate governance system since the beginning 
of financial crisis in 1997. The year 1997 witnessed the worst financial crisis that hit the developing world since 
1982 of Latin America debt crisis. Malaysia is one of the countries that were not spared from the crisis. Therefore, 
there are many factors that contributed to this issue in 1997 such as weak and ineffective of corporate governance, 
weaknesses in the corporate control mechanism for protecting investors and weak enforcement of minority 
shareholder rights. In facts, the introduction of new legislation or changes in the existing legislation has commenced 
long before the financial crisis in 1997 with efforts to strengthen the aspects of corporate governance practices, 
transparency and accountability. Weak governance structured likely contributes for excessive rewards to CEOs in an 
organization in spite of poor firm performance (Dorata & Petra, 2008). According to Core, Holthausen, & Larcker 
(1999), when the CEO is hold the duality position in an organization of a company, it seem that they may act to 
serve the self-interest of the CEO rather than interest of the shareholders due to the CEO’s extraordinary influence 
over board decisions. Moreover, motivation for the merger and acquisition decision is also implicated by enhanced 
CEO compensation (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). Therefore, the CEOs will serve to benefit themselves 
when they overpay for acquisition. 
 
1.1. CEO Compensation and Duality 
 The heart of corporate governance is the boards of director after the shareholders have delegated authority to the 
board to oversee and also control decision made by the managements. Furthermore, the CEOs in an organization 
have varying degrees of influence over the board. According to Core, Holthausen, & Larcker (1999); Hallock 
(1997), there is some evidence that indicates when there are increasing influences over the board, the CEOs pay also 
increases. 
Duality can raise the agency issues that suggest agency theory. It is because, when the CEO has increased their 
decision power, the decision that they have made will benefit management to harm the benefits of the shareholders. 
According to Desai, Kroll, & Wright (2003), the CEO duality is negatively affects acquisition performance for 
agency perspective. Similarly, Wright, Kroll, & Elenkov (2002), argue that when there is a lax monitoring by 
external monitor, the CEOs are further enable to be abusive. They also find that the firm size is a significant 
influence on CEO rewards of acquiring firms with lax external monitoring.  
1.2. CEO Compensation and Merger and Acquisition 
 There are vast literatures that explain motivations of an organization for mergers and acquisition. One of these 
motivations is the merger and acquisitions which can benefit management including the CEO. Besides, according to 
Jensen (1986), an acquisition can increase the firm size, managers’ power and wealth when the availability of free 
cash flow encourages managers to engage in acquisition.  
Shleifer & Vishny (1988) stated that poor performance of acquired firm is due to divestitures of acquired firms 
itself. Besides, to support agency theory, there is stronger evidence which suggest that acquisition is likely to 
enhance compensatory rewards because it increased risk rather than to control management’s self-serving behavior 
by the corporate takeover. 
1.3. CEO Compensation, CEO Duality, and Mergers and Acquisitions  
When the CEOs hold the duality means they hold both position of chair and they also the one who is authorize 
the merger/acquisition decision. It seems that they will stand to personally benefit regardless of firm performance in 
their organization. According to Dorata & Petra (2008), there is an effective monitoring and thus control over 
strategic decisions made by management when the board of directors is active and powerful relative to the CEO. 
Conversely, this study argues that CEO duality may provide a rich opportunity to make sub optimal decisions and 
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reduces effective monitoring by the board. Yet these decisions are warrant greater remuneration despite performance 
as viewed by management as risk taking.  
 
1.4. Problem statement 
Agency theory issues are interrelated with corporate governance failure. This is due to the imbalance as well as 
conflict that arise between agents and principal holders. If the implementation of corporate governance is ineffective 
and not properly managed, it will cause problem like ineffective control, shareholders and management conflicts 
that may lead to corporate scandal. This problem may affect the company operation and performance.  
Thus, the implementation of corporate governance will both lead to an increase and provide financial reporting 
quality of the company in order to gain the confident of investor. However, due to existing corporate governance 
failure, corporate scandals are on the rise. This is the part which can affect the performance and image of the 
company. The corporate governance failure at company level can be detected by looking at certain corporate failure 
like misconduct in the directorship, overstated revenue, misstated financial position of the company and the same 
person holding both major shares and the position of executive chairman of the company (CEO duality) (Norwani, 
Mohamad, & Chek, 2011). 
The CEO that hold the both position of chair and also have right to authorize the merger/acquisition decision are 
likely to have self-serving motivation regardless of firm performance. According to Dorata & Petra (2008) and 
Shleifer & Vishny (1988), CEO also having motivation to do merge and acquisition because to enhance their 
compensation. If the motivation to merge or acquire another company is driven by self-serving interest of the CEO, 
this CEO’s motivation may be further exacerbated when the CEO also act as the chairman of the company (CEO 
duality role). 
1.5. Research objective  
The study seeks to examine whether the CEO duality further exacerbates CEO’s motivation of self-interest to 
engage in merger and acquisition to increase their compensation.  
Specifically, the study objectives are as follows:  
1) To examine the relationship between CEO duality and compensation scheme.  
2) To examine the relationship between merger and acquisition with compensation scheme.  
3) To examine the relationship between CEO duality and merger/acquisition with compensation scheme.  
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Corporate Governance in Malaysia  
According to Kiel & Nicholson (2003), there are a lot of cases and issues relating to the accounting scandal, 
corporate collapse and others which causes the failure of corporate governance practice. Moreover, due to Asia 
financial crisis in year 1997-1998, the importance of corporate governance has boosted up and highlighted public 
awareness relating to the weaknesses of Malaysia‟s corporate governance practice (Norwani et al., 2011). Because 
of that, there was resulting in reforming and improving the corporate governance practice. Since 1998, corporate law 
has been used as a way to improve corporate governance practice in an organization and country. After that, in year 
1999 under the initiative of Ministry of Finance, the High Level Financial Committee on corporate governance was 
reformed (Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 2008). Under this reformed, the committee will be responsible to review the 
corporate governance framework and to make some improvement to the weak areas in the corporate control. 
2.2. Relationship of Compensation with Corporate Governance  
Some of the prior research finds that weaker corporate governance is positively associated to CEO compensation 
(B. Boyd, 1994; Sapp, 2008; Wright et al., 2002). Other prior research also reports that pay-performance sensitivity 
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increases with span of authority (Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003), which the weak governance and also ownership 
attributes are positively related to CEO’s bonus and option compensation (Chalmers, Koh, & Stapledon, 2006) and 
that CEOs in firms with the CEO influence on governance command higher compensation (Cremers & Nair, 2005).  
     The imposition of Internal Revenue Code on the compensation packages of CEOs also mitigates the increase in 
salary that associated with the new CEO and increases the sensitivity of bonus-pay performance (Balsam & Ryan, 
2008). According to Boyd (1994); Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt (1993); Shivdasani (1993), the characteristics of 
BOD, executives’ compensation increased when the board is relatively weak. For example, Core et al., (1999), 
found that weak practices on governance likes larger boards, the percentage of gray non-executives directors, also 
the percentage of non-executives directors appointed by CEO, the percentage of old director that over age of 
69years, the duality of the CEO and the number of board position held by non-executive directors are positively 
associated with CEO compensation.  
2.3. Underpinning Theory  
2.3.1 Agency Theory  
The elements and proportion of appropriate corporate governance are related to the agency concept. According to 
Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, & Hashimoto (2005), the agency theory is a theory that concerns a structured approach in 
resolving the problems that occur related to the principle and agent relationship. This theory clarifies the concept of 
separation between ownership and control of the firms. The other party (the agent) acts on behalf of another party 
(the principal) in order to perform duty and services in running the operations and to make the decision in that 
organization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this context, the principal is referred to the shareholder or owners, while 
the agent stands for the managers. Therefore, the agent is bound and must to fulfill legal and economic obligation 
towards the principle (Fontrodona & Sison, 2006). Aligned with agency theory, to ensure the directors are making a 
good decision, the managers or independent directors need to behave in the best interest of shareholder (Shin & 
Kim., 2002). 
2.4. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Figure 1 Theoretical Framework 
 
In this theoretical framework, there are three hypotheses testing which are;  
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality (independent variable) with the compensation scheme 
(dependent variable).  
H2: There is a positive relationship between the engagement of merger and acquisition (independent variable) with 
compensation scheme.  
Then, we are further testing the relationship between interaction CEO duality and merger/acquisition with 
compensation scheme in H3.  
The control variable in this study is to make sure that the sales of the company selected is based on companies 
that having sales in the range of 500,000 and above. Therefore, the sample selected will be in the same size in order 
to generate the consistency of the result. 
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3. Methodology  
3.1. Sample Selection  
The sample for this study can divide into two selections. The first selection, consists of 225 public listed firms on 
Bursa Malaysia at the end of the 2012 with the total assets of each company is more than 500million. These firms 
did not engaged in merger or acquisition during 2012. Second selections, 129 firms for year end 2012 that engaged 
in merger or acquisition were selected in initial sample obtained from Bursa Malaysia. Lastly, the original samples 
are screened on the following criteria; 1) Availability of financial data on data stream or through Bursa website  
2)  Availability of compensation and governance data from 2012 proxy statement in annual report. 3) The process of 
acquisition and merging company whether the company was completed their merger and   acquisition process or still 
pending.  
The final samples of 298 companies were selected which represents 209 non-merger and acquisition and 89 
merger and acquisition companies. The sample has excluded finance industries because their differences in nature of 
business, accounting, practices and treatment compared the nature of other companies (Arce & Mora, 2002; Nelson, 
Puat, & Jamil., 2011). The differences between other industries’ accounting practices may impair the relevancy of 
measurement in the financial statements provided.  
3.2. Data Collection  
The main sources of data in this study are collected from the companies’ annual reports that can be obtains 
through Bursa Malaysia website and also from Osiris DataStream for accounting data. But in case if the information 
sought is not available on the Bursa Malaysia website, the website of that company itself will be referred to get the 
necessary information. According to Saleh et al.,(2011) and Sumiani et al.,(2007) as cited by Syed Ab Rahman, 
(2013), the most easily obtainable sources of information, either in term of hard copies or electric formats is the 
annual reports of listed companies. Therefore, it can support the researchers as well as student to conduct their 
research study purpose in obtaining information.  
3.3. Regression model  
This study is using regression model in order to examine the association between compensation and duality as 
well as merger and acquisitions.  
 
COMP it = β΋+ βΌ(DUAL it) + β΍(SIZE it) + Ԑt                                                       (1)  
COMP it = β΋+ βΌ(MANDA it) + β΍(SIZE it) + Ԑt                                                                                                       (2) 
Then, further regression is testing in order to examine the relationship between interaction duality and 
merger/acquisition with compensation scheme.  
 
COMP it = β΋+ βΌ(DUAL it) + β΍(MANDA it) + β₃ (SIZE it) + βΏሺሻ൅βΐሺሻ+ Ԑt                          (3)
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Table 1 Summary of Explanation of Variables 
No   Abbreviation     Definition                               Sources of document  
Dependent variable:  
Total compensation of 
directors  
 
   
Comp it  
 
 
The total of compensation of directors during the year  
(Cianci, Fernando & Werner, 2011). 
 
Company annual report for    
financial report year ending 
2012.  
 
Independent variable: 
CEO duality  
 
 
 
 
 
MANDA  
 
 
 
Control variables:  
 
SIZE  
 
 
 
 
 
DSIZE  
 
 
 
 
DMANDA  
 
   
        βı  
 
 
 
      
 
        β΍  
 
 
 
 
        
        βΎ  
 
 
 
         
 
          βΏ  
 
 
 
 
         βΐ  
 
 
1 if the CEO also the chairperson of 
the board meeting and 0 or 
otherwise. (e.g., B. K. Boyd, 1995; 
Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim, & Lee, 
2009) 
 
1 if the company engaged in 
acquisition or merger during the 
year and 0 for otherwise. (Dorata & 
Petra, 2008)  
 
 
The log of sales for the firm during 
the year. (Cianci et al., 2011; Jr & 
Watts, 1992; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & 
Gomez-Mejia., 2000) 
 
 
The interaction between DUALITY 
and SIZE during the year.  
 
 
Interaction between DUALITY and 
MANDA during the year  
 
                        
                     Company annual report     
                     for financial report year  
       ending 2012.  
 
                         
                      Company annual report   
                       for financial report year  
        ending 2012  
 
                       
                      
                        Company annual report  
                        for financial report year  
          ending 2012.  
 
                        
 
                        Company annual report  
                        for financial report year  
           ending 2012.  
 
 
                         Company annual report  
                for financial year  
            ending 2012.  
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are used to explore the data collected and to summarize and describe those data (mean and 
standard deviation). 
4.1.1 Non-Merger/Non-Acquisition Companies  
Table 2 shows the result for non-merger/non-acquisition companies. The samples for the non- merger are 209 
companies. The total compensation shows the value mean is RM 5,435.47. While, median is RM 3,024 and standard 
deviation is RM 9,436.76. Besides that, the sales show the mean is RM 2,048,984, median RM 665,844 and standard 
deviation is RM 4,325,202. While, for the total assets show the mean of RM 8,015,977, the median is RM 1,388,483 
and the standard deviation is RM 58,001,073. The result also shows the mean net income for non-merger companies 
are RM237, 290, the median are RM 73,386 and the standard deviation are RM569, 940.  
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Non-Merger/ Non Acquisition Companies 
  N Mean  Min Max Median  SD 
Total Compensation(‘000)  209  5,435.47  192  111,300  3,024  9,436.76  
Sales(‘000)  209  2,048,984  496  35,848,400  665,844  4,325,202  
Total Assets(‘000)  209  8,015,977  1,195  831,823,000  1,388,483  58,001,073  
Net Income(‘000)  209  237,290  -474,963  4,410,500  73,386  569,940  
ROE(percentage)  209  12.85  -37.92  174.06  9.7  20.22  
ROA(percentage)  209  6.71  -17.3  62.9  5.26  8.12  
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4.1.2 Merger/ Acquisition companies 
 
       Table 3 showed result for the descriptive of merger/acquisition companies. The samples for the merger are 89 
companies. The total compensation shows the value mean are RM 3,779.36. While, the median are RM 2, 027 and 
standard deviation are RM 6, 981.75.  Besides that, the sales show mean are RM 3,899,889, median are RM 288,591 
and standard deviation are RM 21,942,828. The total assets show the mean of RM 5,171,608, median RM 549,120 
and standard deviation RM 1,686,809. The result also shows the mean of net income for merger companies are RM 
198,788.50. Then, for the median is RM 20,001.5 and the standard deviation is RM 580,391.4. The ROE shows the 
value mean 8%, median 10.32% and standard deviation 24.619%. The ROA also showed the mean 5.93%, the 
median 5.98% and standard deviation 10.037%.  
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Merger/ Acquisition Companies 
  N Mean  Min Max Median  SD 
Total Compensation(‘000)  89 3,779.36 69 59,259 2,027 6,981,75 
Sales(‘000)  89 3,899,889 5517 201,955,789 288,591 21,942,828 
Total Assets(‘000)  89 5,171,608 
 
13,795 129,021,494 549,120 16,868,019 
Net Income(‘000)  89 198,788.5 -29,520 4,166,200 20,001.5 580,391.4 
ROE(percentage)  89 8 -168.62 56.89 10.32 24,619 
ROA(percentage)  89 5.93 -51.81 37.51 5.98 10.037 
4.2. Correlation between variables  
Based on correlation study, the results will report Pearson correlation coefficients as a measure of the linear 
relationships that exist among variables. The table 4 showed the correlation between dependent and independent 
variables. The result showed CEO compensation is significantly positively correlated with DUAL and SIZE. There 
is no significant negative correlation between COMP and MANDA. The finding suggests that the firms will have 
higher compensation when they do not involve in mergers/acquisition.  
Besides that, the sale (SIZE) is not significantly positively correlated with MANDA. This shows that SIZE is 
not give impact towards merger and acquisition when the CEO is having decision to do merger and acquisition. 
Based on the value Pearson Correlation(r) below, the correlation explained that the variables are having weak 
relationship between each other because the value r < ±0.5. 
 
Table 4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients between variables 
 COMP  DUAL  SIZE MANDA 
COMP      1 0.181**   0.442** -0.086 
  (0.002)  (0.000) (0.137) 
DUAL 
 
SIZE  
     1  -0.2  
(0.729) 
    1 
-0.016 
(0.788) 
 0.068 
    (0.243) 
MANDA          1 
     
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
4.3. Regression Test  
4.3.1 Relationship between Compensation Scheme with CEO duality  
Table 5 represents the merger sub sample of total compensation (COMP) with CEO duality (DUAL) and firm 
size (SIZE). The results show that DUAL, and SIZE had significant and positive relationship with COMP at the 0.05 
level. Based on the results of Standardized Beta Coefficients the SIZE seems to have a large effect compared to the 
other variables in the COMP model.  
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The independent variable explains that 41.9% of the variance of the COMP. The R2 (17.5%) is higher than the 
Adjusted R2 (16.3%). 17.5% of the COMP is mainly due to the independent variable and the 82.5% indicates of 
other factor. The probability of the F statistic (104.024) for the overall regression relationship for all independent 
variables is p<0.05. This finding supports the research estimation that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the set of all independent variables and the dependent variable.  
Therefore, this result showed that H1 was supported and it was aligned with prior research that there is a 
positive association between CEO compensation and firm size when there is CEO duality (Dorata & Petra, 2008). 
Furthermore, according to Core et al., (1999), they also found that high CEO compensation is associated with weak 
governance structure including CEO duality. Based on the result, the regression model is:  
 
COMP = 2181.57 + 4788.35(DUAL) +2500.45(SIZE) 
 
Table 5 Association between Compensation and Duality 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Unstandardized Coefficients   
 B SE B T Sig 
       
INTERCEPT  2181.57 815.499   2.675 0.008 
DUAL  4788.35 1400.721 0.217 3.418 0.001 
       
SIZE  2500.45 500.75 0.317 4.938 0.000 
R=0.419, R2=0.175, Adjusted R2=0.163, F-statistic=104.024, p-value=0.000 
4.3.2 Relationship between Compensation Scheme with Merger and Acquisition   
Table 6 represents the total compensation (COMP) with firm size (SIZE), and MANDA. The results show that 
all independent variables had significant and positive relationship with COMP at the 0.05 level. Based on the results 
of Standardized Beta Coefficients the SIZE seems to have a large effect compared to the other variables in the 
COMP model.  
The independent variable explains 71.4% of the variance of the COMP. The R2 (51%) is higher than the 
Adjusted R2 (50.4%). 51% of the COMP is mainly due to the independent variable and the 49% indicates the other 
factor. The probability of the F statistic (764.388) for the overall regression relationship for all independent variables 
is p<0.05. This finding supports the research estimation that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
the set of all independent variables and the dependent variable.  
This result shows that compensation has significant relationship with merger and acquisition of the firm. It 
support from vast literature by Jensen (1986), an acquisition can increase the firm size, managers’ power and wealth 
when the availability of free cash flow encourages managers to engage in acquisition.  Based on the result, the 
regression model is: 
  
COMP = 1107.47 + 798.67(SIZE) + 25.578(ROE)+1138.518(MANDA) 
 
Table 6 Association between Compensation and Merger and Acquisition 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Unstandardized Coefficients   
 B SE B T Sig 
       
INTERCEPT  1107.47 970.851   1.141 0.255 
SIZE 798.67 545.51 0.701 14.925 0.000 
       
MANDA  1138.518 553.503 0.097 2.057  0.041 
R=0.714, R2=0.510, Adjusted R2=0.504, F-statistic=764.388, p-value=0.000 
4.3.3 Relationship between Compensation, Duality and Interaction Variable for Mergers/ Acquisition 
Table 7 represents total compensation (COMP) with CEO duality (DUAL), firm size (SIZE), mergers 
(MANDA) and interaction between variables. The results show that independent variables namely (DUAL and 
MANDA) had significant and positive relationship with COMP at the 0.05 level. However independent variables 
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(SIZE, DSIZE, DMANDA) had no significant but positive relationship with COMP at the 0.05 level. Based on the 
results of Standardized Beta Coefficients the SIZE seems to have a large effect compared to the other variables in 
the COMP model.  
The independent variable explains that 74.5% of the variance of the COMP. The R2 (55.5%) is higher than the 
Adjusted R2 (55.43%). 55.5% of the COMP is mainly due to the independent variable and the 44.5% indicates of 
other factor. The probability of the F statistic (57.608) for the overall regression relationship for all independent 
variables is p<0.05. This finding supports the research estimation that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the set of all independent variables and the dependent variable.  
Therefore, this finding is also supported H3, which there is a positive relationship between CEO compensation 
and firm size when the firm engaged in merger/acquisition, then it is stronger when there is CEO duality. When the 
CEOs hold the duality means they hold both position of chair and they also the one who is authorize the 
merger/acquisition decision. It seems that they will stand to personally benefit regardless of firm performance in 
their organization.  Based on the result, the regression model is;  
 
COMP = 3765.87 + 2768.93(DUAL) +967.34(SIZE) -765.43(MANDA) +457.893(DSIZE) -345.67(DMANDA) 
 
Table 7 The Association between Compensation, Duality and Interaction Variable for Mergers/ Acquisition 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Unstandardized Coefficients   
 B SE B T Sig 
       
INTERCEPT  3765.87 1003.65   2.657 0.000 
DUAL  2768.93 987.45 0.276 2.167 0.000 
       
SIZE  
 
MANDA  
 
DSIZE 
 
DMANDA  
967.34 
 
-765.43 
 
457.893 
 
-345.56 
835.34 
 
566.87 
 
104.56 
 
83.58 
0.54 
 
-0.297 
 
0.256 
 
-0.367 
3.154  
 
-1.458 
 
3.476 
 
0.342 
0.236 
 
0.028 
 
0.345 
 
0.067 
R=0.745, R2=0.555, Adjusted R2=0.5543, F-statistic=57.608, p-value=0.000 
5. Conclusion  
The findings of this study shows that a governance structure, specifically duality, has an impact on the CEO 
compensation. Duality on itself also is significant contributor for the compensation of CEOs who engaged in merger 
and acquisition. Size also one of the factor that give significant influences over the compensation of CEOs that 
involved in merger and acquisition.  
Although CEO in some merger and acquisition cases may not have the duality roles, the CEO however still 
compensated for merger and acquisition risk in spite of the firm performance. Besides, in additionally, the firm that 
does not engaged in merger and acquisition and their CEO holds duality positions, size is more relevant than firm 
performance for compensation purpose. This shows that the findings were supported the research objectives which 
is the CEO duality is one of the factor that motivated the CEO doing the merger and acquisition in order to increase 
their compensation. 
Thus, this study contribute to improve knowledge of business stakeholders such as shareholders, management, 
regulators and reader about the current condition of corporate governance and compensation schemes among the 
merger and non-merger companies in Malaysian Public Listed Companies. This is because, the corporate 
governance structure such as CEO duality has impact on compensation scheme which can lead to self-interest of the 
CEO thus can create corporate scandal of the companies. Moreover, it can serves as references for Malaysian 
companies and regulators bodies such as Bursa Malaysia, Malaysia Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and 
Securities Commission (SC) in formulating and revising regulation, requirement or reformation of guidelines and 
practices with a view to improve the corporate governance to be more effective Malaysian companies on Bursa 
Malaysia. However, this study incorporates only one corporate governance structure which is CEO duality. This 
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measurement may not be accurate enough to measure the level of corporate governance towards compensation 
schemes of the directors.  
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